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be no retreat from their illogical position on prepaid income. The need
now is for Congress to devise a plan which will serve the interests of
both the Treasury and the taxpayer. A statute which eliminates the provision for a double deduction in the transitional year from one accounting
method to another (which was the undesirable provision that caused the
repeal of sections 452 and 462), but which specifically provides for the
deferral of accurately computed prepaid income, will satisfy the needs
of both the Treasury and the taxpayer. The Treasury would receive its
share of income according to the statutory rate, and the taxpayer would
be able to apply his accrual system consistently.
ChristopherJ. Clark

HABEAS CORPUS-

FEDERAL COURTS HAVE POWER To ISSUE

THE

WRIT PROVIDED PETITIONER HAS EXHAUSTED REMEDIES AVAILABLE
IN STATE COURT AT TIME OF APPLICATION.

Fay v. Noia (U.S. 1963)
Defendant Noia and two others were convicted in New York, in 1942,
of first degree felony-murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Their
respective convictions rested solely on the basis of confessions which each
alleged to have been coerced. Noia failed to appeal and his codefendants'
timely appeals were unsuccessful. Eventually however, one codefendant
obtained release through federal habeas corpus on the grounds that his
confession clearly had been coerced and his conviction procured in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The other cofelon, on rehearing before
the highest state court, secured a reversal of his conviction on the same
grounds. Noia, because of his failure to appeal, could not obtain similar
relief in the state courts and therefore filed an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in the federal district court. Relief was denied on the
ground that his failure to appeal precluded relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,1
which the court interpreted as requiring an applicant to exhaust his state
remedies before being entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. The Court
of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, three justices dissenting,
1. The statute reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State,
or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights
of the prisoner.

An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right
under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question
presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
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affirmed on three grounds holding that: (1) Noia's failure to appeal was
not a failure to exhaust "the remedies available in the courts of the
State" under section 2254 of the Judicial Code, since such exhaustion refers
only to those state remedies still available; (2) there was no intelligent
and understanding waiver; (3) the doctrine of adequate and independent
state grounds should not be extended to limit federal habeas corpus. Fay
83 S.Ct. 822 (1963).
U.S .................
v. Noia, ............
2
The origin of the writ of habeas corpus in the United States can be
traced to the Federal Judiciary Act of 17893 which provided that the
Great Writ could issue from a federal court only where the prisoner was
in federal custody. In 1867, Congress first extended federal habeas corpus
to state prisoners for any detention in violation of the Constitution, laws
or treaties of the United States. 4 The Supreme Court followed a pattern
similar to that of Congress. At first the Court held that habeas corpus
could properly be granted to state prisoners only where a state court
lacked original jurisdiction. However, the landmark decisions of Moore
v. Dempsey5 and Johnson v. Zerbst6 allowed the writ when the state tribunal had initial jurisdiction but proceeded to judgment in violation of
petitioner's constitutional rights.7 As the jurisdictional basis of habeas
corpus expanded, abuses of the writ increased proportionately.8 This parallel development found the Court (by self-imposition), 9 and the Legislature (by statute)1 0 limiting the availibility of habeas corpus in aid of state
prisoners. These limitations are chiefly three: the doctrines of waiver,
independent and adequate state ground, and exhaustion of state remedies.
The Court first addressed itself to the problem of an adequate and
independent state ground." The purpose of this doctrine, announced in
2. For a history and development of the writ, see generally Hart, Foreward:
The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REv.
84 (1959) ; Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding,
74 HARV. L. Rnv. 1315 (1961) ; Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
70 HARV. L. Rev. 1 (1956) ; Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
55 COLUM. L. Riv. 196 (1955).
3. 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (1789). See Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
4. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 1, 14 Stat. 385.
5. 261 U.S. 86, 43 S.Ct. 265 (1923) (mob domination of trial).
6. 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938) (denial of counsel).
7. For other examples of constitutional violations, see Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936) (extorted confession); Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935) (deliberate use of perjured testimony). The combined
result of these four cases was to flood the federal courts with applications for habeas
corpus, the majority of which proved groundless.
8. See statistics and comments in the following sources: Goodman, Use and
Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313 (1948) ; Speck, Statistics on
Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 011O ST. L.J. 337 (1949) (complete statistics).
9. Unfavorable judicial reaction to this sudden wave of groundless petitions for
federal habeas corpus is perhaps best illustrated by the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 67 S.Ct. 1588 (1947): "I think
it is fair to say that the scope of habeas corpus in the federal courts is an untidy area
of our law that calls for much more systematic consideration than it has thus far
received." Id. at 184, 67 S.Ct. at 1594.
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958). For the full text of the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, see supra note 1.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958). For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of
independent and adequate state ground and its proper relation to habeas corpus, see
Reitz, supra note 2, at 1338.
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. to prevent

a useless and profitless reversal, which can do the plaintiff in error no
good, and can only embarrass and delay the defendant.' 2 Inherent in this
purpose was the refusal and inability of the Court to render advisory
opinions. 13 Federal concern for the right of the states to control their own
judicial systems and a respect for finality in state criminal proceedings
support this policy.
The Supreme Court in Daniels v. Allen 14 extended this doctrine from
the traditional area of direct appellate review, holding that it barred federal
habeas corpus as well. Prior to the Fay case Mr. Justice Brennan, commenting on the Daniels decision, accurately termed this problem one of
policy-whether to leave the federal judge with his full discretionary power,
or to bind him by the rule that governs the Supreme Court on direct
review of state court judgments.' 5 In 1959, the Supreme Court in Irvin
v. Dowd 16 implied that the adequate state ground rule should not apply
to federal habeas corpus as it does to direct review, although the majority
based their holding on the fact that the defendant had met the exhaustion
requirement. Professor Hart, agreeing with the dissent in Irvin, urged
that a federal court should be compelled to close its doors to a prisoner
whose conviction rests on state law grounds sufficient to bar direct
Supreme Court review. 17 Professor Reitz, on the other hand, claims that
such an extension is unwarranted.' 8
The Fay Court intimated no view as to whether Noia's default can
be deemed adequate and independent. However, the majority went on to
say that even if it were, Noia could not be denied federal relief on that
basis since the adequate state ground rule is a function of the limitations
of appellate review only. One reason for this view is based on the different
jurisdictional prerequisites for the two remedies. The prerequisite for
direct appellate review is a judgment of a state court whereas habeas
corpus requires only detention. Another difference is that in habeas corpus,
the federal court does not purport to pass upon, but assumes,' 9 the correctness of the state courts' interpretations or applications of state procedural
law, and orders the prisoner released. In balancing the respective federal
and state interests in the principal case, the court noted that the only
relevant substantive law is the Fourteenth Amendment. State law appears
12. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635 (1875).

13. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26, 65 S.Ct. 459, 463 (1945).
14. Daniels v. Allen, reported sub noam. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct.
397 (1953).
15. Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in
Federalism,7 UTAH L. Rvv. 423, 424 (1961).
16. 359 U.S. 394, 79 S.Ct. 825 (1959). Frankfurter, J., dissenting, would have
extended to habeas corpus jurisdiction the rule barring direct review by the Supreme
Court of the United States of state court decisions resting solely on adequate and
independent state grounds.
17. Hart, supra note 2, at 118-19. "To the extent that state procedures would be
respected by the Supreme Court on direct review . . .they should also be respected
as precluding release on collateral review by a federal district court."
18. Reitz, supra note 2, at 1348.
19. Brennan, supra note 15, at 436.
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only in the procedural framework for adjudicating the substantive federal
20
question.
Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, accused the majority of skirting the
real issue-whether Noia's conviction did, in fact, rest upon independent
and adequate state grounds. To the dissent, which agreed with the dissent21
ing opinion in Irvin, this was the controlling factor.
The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies, briefly stated, is that a
federal court will not interfere in a state criminal prosecution before the
22
state courts had had the opportunity to dispose of the matter themselves.
By so doing, a conflict in the delicate area of federal-state relations is
23
avoided. The underlying policy here is one of comity between courts,

but this is not an absolute doctrine. 24 The theory of exhaustion was
codified by Congress 25 in 1948.
The Supreme Court in Darr v. Burford26 interpreted section 2254 to
require exhaustion of state remedies, including application to the United
States Supreme Court for certiorari, as a prerequisite to granting federal
habeas corpus relief, thereby lending further judicial support to the statutory doctrine., In Daniels v. Allen 27 the Supreme Court denied federal
habeas corpus to a prisoner, under penalty of death, whose attorney filed
appeal papers one day late, on the ground that "a failure to use the state's
available remedy, in the absence of some interference or incapacity . . .
bars federal habeas corpus. ' '28 Subsequently in Irvin v. Dowd29 the Daniels
rationale lost some of its vitality. The Court held that petitioner had exhausted his state remedies since the Indiana Supreme Court had reached
the merits of Irvin's federal claim, thus permitting the district court to determine the merits of his constitutional contentions. After the Irvin decision
the judicial pendulum continued to swing away from the Daniels rationale
in the direction of Irvin and greater flexibility. In short, the stage was set
for the instant decision.
20. Recognizing this as largely a policy decision, the majority resolved it by
saying that "conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted
to defeat the manifest federal policy that constitutional rights of personal liberty not
be denied without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review." Fay v.
Noia, 83 S.Ct. 822, 841 (1963).

21. "The short of it is that Noia's incarceration rests entirely on an adequate and

independent state ground-namely, that he knowingly failed to perfect any appeal from
his conviction of murder." Id. at 852 (dissenting opinion).
22. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 247, 6 S.Ct. 734, 738 (1886).
23. For a discussion of comity and its relation to the problem of exhaustion of
remedies, see Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950), and cases cited
therein.
24. Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116, 64 S.Ct. 448, 451 (1944). In this case the
Supreme Court held that "ordinarily" exhaustion is required, thereby implying that in
extraordinary situations the rule can properly be disregarded.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Supp. 1951). For a discussion of the legislative history of
the 1948 amendments, see Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal
Courts, 25 B.U.L. Rv. 26 (1945).
26. 339 U.S. 200, 70 S.Ct. 587 (1950).
27. Daniels v. Allen, reported sub nom. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct.
397 (1953).
28. "To allow habeas corpus in such circumstances would subvert the entire
system of state criminal justice and destroy state energy in the detection and punishment of crime." Id. at 485, 73 S.Ct. 421-22.
29. 359 U.S. 394, 79 S.Ct. 825 (1959).
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The Fay Court overruled Darr v. Burford30 to the extent that that
case barred a state prisoner from federal habeas relief if his petition for
review by the Supreme Court were untimely. The Court reasoned that
since certiorari is not a matter of right, but discretionary, it is not meant
to be included in the list of remedies to be exhausted. Although not expressly done, the Court also seems to have overruled Daniels sub silentio
by holding that section 2254 refers only to a failure to exhaust state
remedies still open to the applicant at the time he files his application for
habeas corpus in the federal court. What remnants of the exhaustion
doctrine, enunciated in Darr and Daniels, remain in view of the principal
case? Cannot a prisoner allow his state remedies to pass by and later apply
for federal habeas corpus claiming that no remedies are available when he
applies? Is state habeas corpus one of the remedies to be exhausted as a
prerequisite to federal habeas relief since many state prisoners might prefer the impartial treatment of federal courts to the possible prejudice of
state courts? Although the Fay opinion re-emphasizes the discretion of a
federal judge in denying habeas corpus to a prisoner who has failed to
exhaust state remedies available at the time of application, the Court
leaves unanswered these and a myriad of other practical questions.
The Court lastly addressed itself to the problem of waiver. Courts
have long held that a person may waive certain constitutional rights if the
waiver is freely made. 31 In this sense the purpose of waiver is to provide
a legitimate shortcut in the judicial process. In these cases the choice is
made before the time for assertion of the right arrives. More recently
however, the Court has applied an after-the-fact type of waiver where it
32
has found that circumstances indicated a waiver by operation of law.
The classic definition of waiver was announced in Johnson v. Zerbst
as ". . . an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege. ''3 3 One might ask at the outset if the Fay Court added to or
subtracted from that definition. A hasty answer would be that it actually
did neither, since the Court expressly stated that the Zerbst definition
furnishes the controlling standard.3 4 However, the Court proceeded to
expand that definition to fit Noia's singular predicament and offered further guidelines to federal judges who must decide the waiver issue. These
guidelines are as follows: (1) there must be a considered choice on the
part of the petitioner; (2) a choice made by counsel not participated in by
the petitioner does not automatically bar relief; (3) nor does the state
court's finding of waiver bar independent determination of the question by
the federal courts on habeas corpus, for waiver affecting federal rights is
a federal question. 35 Applying these rules to the instant case, the court
30. 339 U.S. 200, 70

S.Ct. 587 (1950).

31. Reitz, supra note 2, at 1333.
32. Daniels v. Allen, reported sub noain. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct.
397 (1953).
33. 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938).
34. Fay v. Noia, 83 S.Ct. 822, 849 (1963).
35. For a discussion of the question of a state court's determination of factual
issues and the power of a federal court in subsequent habeas corpus proceedings to
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found that under the circumstances, Noia's failure to appeal cannot be
deemed a merely tactical step, or in any way a deliberate circumvention of
state procedures. Underlying the majority's position is the refusal to
assume the role of a passive observer while a prisoner such as Noia suffers
long imprisonment or even death when his constitutional rights clearly
have been violated, owing to a state procedural rule. However, the Court,
by placing great emphasis on the fact that Noia feared the death penalty
on retrial and that his cofelons had already secured their freedom, seems
to be guilty of unconsciously administering a brand of "relative justice."
In Daniels the prisoner was under penalty of death, but habeas corpus was
denied him. Would the Court here have found an "intelligent waiver"
present if the maximum penalty facing Noia on retrial were life imprisonment, and he still failed to appeal? The answer is not clear. Perhaps the
majority merely created another category of "exceptional circumstances"
confined to the facts of the principal case. 6
It is now necessary to determine whether or not the purposes of the
three limitations on habeas corpus would be served by giving effect to
these doctrines in Noia's situation. It will be apparent why the Fay decision for the most part, defined the limits of the Great Writ more clearly
than earlier decisions.
If the purpose of the doctrine of an independent and adequate state
ground is to prevent a useless and profitless reversal, it is clear that the
purposes would not be implemented by its application to habeas corpus.
Congress chose not to incorporate the independent state ground doctrine
into the habeas corpus statute. This was avoided because the functions of
direct review and habeas corpus are themselves different. Furthermore,
nothing in the habeas statute, substantially unchanged since 1867, suggests
that it was intended to express any direct relationship between federal
and state proceedings. Also, as concepts of due process change, it is
fitting that such changes should be reflected in the collateral relief afforded
by habeas corpus. The alternative would be to allow clear violations of
constitutional rights such as Noia's to go unredressed because the traditional limitations on direct review demand this result.
Since the chief purpose of exhaustion is to allow state courts to pursue
their criminal proceedings to conclusion, it is obvious that in Noia's case
this purpose will not be accomplished. The State of New York offered no
further post-conviction remedies to Noia and intended to proceed no
further. This would result in Noia's incarceration notwithstanding an admittedly clear constitutional violation.
As for waiver, Fay eliminates certain fictions by holding waiver
effective only when exercised by a defendant in accordance with the
Zerbst definition. This is the sounder view, since in no case should waiver
afford petitioner a full hearing on his constitutional claims, see Townsend v. Sain,
83 S.Ct. 745 (1963).
36. Compare United States ex rel. Smith v. Jackson, 234 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1956);
Pennsylvania ex rel. Woods v. Cavell, 157 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
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